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I. INTRODUCTION
As we face the widespread transition from analog to digital television,
arguments are being made with increasing frequency by organizations such
as the National Cable Television Association ("NCTA") that regulations
like digital must-carry violate cable operators' Fifth Amendment rights.'
*M.A. University of Florida, College of Journalism and Mass Communications; J.D.
University of Florida, Levin College of Law. Ph.D. student, University of Florida, College
of Journalism and Mass Communications; Instructor of Record, Department of
Telecommunication, University of Florida; Legal Assistant, F. Parker Lawrence, P.A.
**Assistant Professor, Department of Telecommunication, University of Florida. M.A.,
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1. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, WHY THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT ADOPT A BROAD
VIEW OF THE "PRIMARY VIDEO" CARRIAGE OBLIGATION, Enclosure to Letter from David L.
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These arguments have been made in the past, although most cases have
failed to reach the Fifth Amendment claims by deciding the issues solely
on First Amendment grounds. 2 And yet, without a clear understanding of
the extent of the property rights held by cable operators, and the
relationship between such property rights and speech rights, the legal
analysis of such claims will remain incomplete.
Although such claims are nascent, they ultimately raise important
policy implications for the future of cable regulation, particularly in the
broadband era.3 Property rights may form an alternative basis by which to
limit must-carry and access regulations because property rights form the
basis of takings and due process claims brought under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Takings Clause, as incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits both state and federal governments from
appropriating private property for public use without just compensation. 4
Similarly, the Due Process Clause prohibits state or federal deprivations of
property without due process of law. 5 At least theoretically, a taking
requires just compensation while a due process violation requires
invalidation. 6 Differences between due process and takings analyses,
however, have been historically muddled. The process beginning with the
Brenner, Senior Vice President, NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, Federal
Communication Commission (Jul. 9, 2002), www.ncta.com/Pdf_Files/exparte-tribe.doc.pdf
[hereinafter TRIBE MEMORANDUM].
2. See, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Justice
O'Connor in Turner I noted that imposing common carrier like obligations on cable
operators may raise Takings Clause questions. Id. at 684. In fact, the only case to date that
has analyzed cable property rights in the access context was later vacated. Berkshire
Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 988-89 (D. R.I. 1983),
vacated, 773 F.2d 382 (1985).
3. Yochai Benkler, commenting on the cable broadband access debate, in 2000, noted
that "[t]he importance of the question of whether infrastructure is privately or publicly
owned (or not owned at all) is partly dependent on our regulatory response to the question of
the relationship between ownership over physical infrastructure and control over content."
Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1203, 1236 (2000) (citation omitted).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States ...."
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V & U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment provides that "nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law ...... ' The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment states that "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. "
6. Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking: Can
Recreational Trails Survive the Court's Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?, 26
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 399, 414 (2001).
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1922 Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, in which the
majority announced that certain regulations can go too far in their
interference with property rights, thus becoming the de facto equivalent of
a direct taking.
7
With respect to cable regulation, significant free speech implications
may be muddying the waters further. Neither speech nor property rights are
exclusive of one another. The degree to which cable historically has had
autonomy over its facilities-as established through regulation and
tradition-influences both speech and property rights. The legal ownership
of particular channel space through obligations-such as public,
educational, or government ("PEG") channels, leased-access, and must-
carry-influences the degree to which a cable company may have editorial
control over those channels. 8 The degree to which a franchise creates
property rights, and the degree to which those rights and agreements may
be modified by local or federal law, may influence how a cable facility is
used and who can use the facility.9 While private property owners, in the
traditional sense, may have the right to exclude unwanted and disruptive
speakers from their property, 10 cable operators operate under significant
regulation, but unlike many regulated businesses, cable operates in a field
historically imbued with free speech values. If regulation limits the
property-based claims of highly regulated businesses in fields that do not
directly implicate free speech concerns, 11 then potentially, regulations
7. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984) (discussing Mahon and its
significance to the takings jurisprudence).
8. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC (Denver Area),
518 U.S. 727, 727 (1996) (plurality opinion) (explaining that cable companies may choose
to permit the airing of sexually offensive material).
9. See, e.g., Cox Cable Comm., Inc. v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 553 (M.D.Ga.
1994); Cox Cable Comm. Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 633 (M.D.Ga. 1991); Madison
Cablevision, Inc.v. City of Morganton, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18794 (W.D.N.C., 1990);
Triad CATV, Inc. v. City of Hastings, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17617 (W.D.Mi. 1989); City
Comm., Inc. v. City of Detroit, 650 F. Supp. 1570 (E.D.Mi. 1987); Hopkinsville Cable TV,
Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp 543 (W.D.Ky 1982); Telecomm. of Key
West, Inc. v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1983); Telecomm. of Key West, Inc. v.
United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F.
Supp. 801 (1985).
10. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (describing a historical basis for the right
to exclude); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972) (stating that it never before
"held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. Even
where public property is involved, the Court has recognized that it is not necessarily
available for speaking, picketing, or other communicative activities.").
11. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1010-11 (1984) (holding that
businesses that operate in highly regulated fields may have limited reasonable expectations
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designed to serve free speech values may significantly constrain the
property-based claims of cable providers.
The recent resurgence of legal claims related to digital must-carry
offers the opportunity to reconsider our approach to cable autonomy and to
address the balance of these rights. Addressing this balance is particularly
important given the programming diversity made available through digital
innovation, which increases programming streams and scanning formats as
well as cable capacity to transmit. The debate over digital must-carry must
take into account the administrative and capacity burdens on a cable
operator that attend such diversity, the concerns of local broadcasters in
their attempt to reach cable subscribers, and the concerns of consumers
over access to local broadcast programming. Conceptions of the property
and free speech rights of cable operators influence each of these
concerns. While it may be easier to decide cable autonomy issues solely
on First Amendment grounds, or to attempt to separate the speech and
property concerns, a more holistic picture of cable autonomy rights may
only be possible with the development of a hybrid analysis that looks at the
intersection of speech and cable property rights.
By identifying the legal and policy implications of property rights in
the digital must-carry issue, this Article identifies underlying points of
confusion associated with cable autonomy-a confusion that arises out of
cable's quasi-public, quasi-private status. Absent such analysis, this
confusion may create an inconsistent and unpredictable regulatory and
legal regime in which ever-expanding notions of property may silently and
slowly encroach on prevailing notions of access or, alternatively, buttress
speaker rights. Part II of this Article will begin with a review of must-carry
regulations, including the recent policy debate over dual and multicast
carriage. Part HI will present a traditional Fifth Amendment analysis of
must-carry. Part IV will address some of the free speech implications of
this property-based analysis. Finally, Part V will conclude by showing how
these property-based claims may influence future cable regulatory policies.
HI. MUST-CARRY AND RETRANSMISSION CONSENT RULES
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") faces numerous
concerns regarding must-carry and retransmission consent in the digital
of property claims in light of current and potential regulation).
12. Even though the FCC in 2005 ruled that cable operators only have to carry either an
existing analog or digital-only television station, this debate is far from settled. Broadcasters
have vowed to contest the FCC's decision. Drew Clark, FCC Sides with Cable Industry in
'Multicasting' TV Debate, NATIONAL JOURNAL'S CONGRESSDAILY, Feb. 11, 2005.
[Vol. 58
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context,13 most notably the calculation of cable channel capacity,' 4 the
definitions of "primary video' ' 15 and "program-related[ness], '' 16 and the
preservation of digital signal quality (e.g., material degradation). 17 Part of
the FCC's dilemma in applying the must-carry rules to digital television is
that initial rules were written in an analog environment when each station
delivered programming in the same signal format 18 (NTSC, 525 lines, 4x3
aspect ratio) and in the same amount of channel space (6 MHz). 19 In a
digital environment, however, each station can transmit in eighteen
different scanning formats and may send up to six simultaneous digital
streams of programming. As a result, the application of the must-carry rules
in the digital environment creates a policy quagmire.
A. Analog Must-Carry
The original must-carry rules are found in the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"),
which amends the Communications Act of 1934.20 The 1992 Cable Act
prohibits cable operators and other multichannel video programming
distributors from retransmitting commercial and low-power television
signals, as well as radio broadcast signals, without the broadcaster's
consent. This permission is commonly referred to as retransmission
consent. When a broadcast station chooses to negotiate a retransmission
consent agreement, the cable operator will compensate the station for the
• • 22
placement of its programming on the cable system. Network-affiliated
broadcasters are better positioned to negotiate retransmission agreements
because of the popularity and ratings of their programs. Without these
13. For an overview of the constitutional issues of applying the must-carry rules to
digital television ("DTV"), see Albert N. Lung, Note, Must-Carry Rules in the Transition to
Digital Television: A Delicate Constitutional Balance, 22 CARDozo L. REv. 151 (2000).
14. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, First Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rule [sic] Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, paras. 124-27 (2001)
[hereinafter DTV Must-Carry].
15. Id. paras. 50-57.
16. Id. para. 122.
17. Id. paras. 70-72.
18. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15092, para. 18 (1998).
19. Id. para. 9.
20. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
21. See generally Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An
Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992
Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1997) (providing an overview of cable television and
retransmission content regulation).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(10) (2000).
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stations on their cable lineup, the cable system is likely to lose many
customers. Estimates demonstrate that about 80% of commercial television
broadcasters chose retransmission consent over must-carry in the 1993-96
election cycle.
23
Under the 1992 Cable Act, however, a station may elect the must-
carry option when its carriage does not financially benefit the cable system.
Section 4 of the 1992 Cable Act requires cable operators to carry "the
signals of local commercial television stations and qualified low power
stations . *...,,24 If a cable operator has twelve or fewer usable activated
channels, the cable operator must carry only three local commercial
stations, selected at the cable operator's discretion. Cable operators,
however, may not select a low-power station over a local affiliate and, if
the cable operator elects to carry a local affiliate of a network, it must carry
the affiliate that is nearest to the area served by the cable system. If a cable
operator has more than twelve usable activated stations, however, then this
operator must carry local commercial stations as requested, up to one-third
of all channel capacity.
25
Section 5 of the 1992 Cable Act also gives noncommercial (i.e.,
public) television stations authority to demand carriage.26 Cable systems
consisting of 12 or fewer channels are required to carry the signal of one
qualified local noncommercial educational station.27 Systems with thirteen
to thirty-six channels are required to carry at least one but not more than
three stations, 28 and cable systems with more than thirty-six channels are
required to carry the signal of three noncommercial, educational stations.
29
In order to be considered a qualified noncommercial station, a station either
must be licensed as such and "owned and operated by a public agency,
nonprofit foundation, corporation, or association[,]" 30 or be owned and
operated by a municipality transmitting "predominantly noncommercial
23. Stuart N. Brotman, National Cable Television Association, "Priming The Pump":
The Role of Retransmission Consent in the Transition to Digital Television, October 1999,
available at http://brotman.com/whatsnew-article..priming-content.html (follow link to
Retransmission's Consent Track Record).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2000).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2000).
26. Id. § 535. Some commentators suggest the must-carry provisions protecting public
television were singled out separately from commercial stations because more public
stations had been dropped absent must-carry rules. Yet, the courts have failed to treat
Section 4 or 5 of the 1992 Cable Act discriminately. Monroe E. Price & Donald W.
Hawthorne, Saving Public Television: The Remand of Turner Broadcasting and the Future
of Cable Regulation, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 83 (1994).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 535(b)(2)(A).
28. Id. § 535(b)(3)(A)(i).
29. Id. § 535(e).
30. Id. § 535(l)(1)(A)(i).
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programs for educational purposes. ' 31 Noncommercial stations rely
exclusively on must-carry and, unlike their commercial counterparts, are
not able to seek compensation under the retransmission consent
provisions.
32
In the findings section of the 1992 Cable Act, Congress cited many
justifications for the must-carry and retransmission rules. Congress found
the cable industry to be highly concentrated and worried that this
concentration could lead to barrier-of-entry problems for new programmers
and a reduction of media outlets (i.e., diversity) available to consumers. 33
Congress also contended the cable industry is increasingly vertically
integrated consisting of common ownership among cable operators and
cable programmers, and thus, operators favor affiliated programmers.
34
This integration made it "more difficult for noncable-affiliated
programmers to secure carriage on cable systems." 35 Most importantly,
Congress found there was "substantial governmental and First Amendment
interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple
technology media."3  As laid out in Section 307(b) of the 1934
Communications Act, Congress articulated an important governmental
interest in the carriage of local stations because such carriage was
necessary to provide a "fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of
broadcast services.' 37 Local origination of programming was seen as a
"primary objective" of must-carry regulation because local broadcast
stations are an "important source of local news and public affairs
programming" vital to "an informed electorate."
38
Given all the praise for local broadcasting, Congress found it
necessary to promote the availability of free, over-the-air television to the
public. Realizing the shift in audiences from broadcast to cable
programming, Congress acknowledged that some advertising revenues
would be reallocated to cable. In effect, cable systems carrying local
broadcast stations were competing for advertising revenues on their own
systems, and theoretically, cable operators had an economic incentive to
terminate the retransmission of broadcast signals. Congress contended that
31. Id. § 535(l)(1)(B).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(2)(A) (2000).
33. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 102 Pub. L.
No. 385, §2(a)(2)-(4), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460 (1993).
34. Id. § 2(a)(5).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 2(a)(6).
37. Id. § 2(a)(9).
38. Id. § 2(a)(1 1).
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absent must-carry, there was a strong likelihood that "additional local
broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried."
39
B. Analog Must-Carry Rules Are Constitutional
In 1997, by a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court ruled the must-
carry rules to be constitutionally valid under intermediate scrutiny as
specified by the O'Brien test.40 The Court examined the two inquiries left
open during its prior review in Turner I: first, whether the factual record
developed by the three-judge district court "supports Congress' predictive
judgment that the must-carry provisions further important governmental
interests[,]" 41 and second, whether the rules did "not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further those interests.
42
In answering its first question, the Court reasserted that the rules
furthered three important, interrelated governmental interests: (1)
preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2)
promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity
of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television
programming.
43
Combining these elements, the Court determined the must-carry rules
aided in preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets, a substantial
governmental objective. In reaching this conclusion, the Court exhaustively
elaborated on predicted threats that existed absent any must-carry
requirements. The increasing trends of vertical and horizontal integration in
cable provided operators with the incentive and ability to give preferential
treatment to their affiliated-programming services. 44 Moreover, when cable
subscription percentages leveled off, cable operators were expected to
compete more aggressively with broadcasters for advertising revenue.
45
The Court also demonstrated that a significant number of broadcasting
39. Id. § 2(2)(a)(15). In light of the frequency with which retransmission consent is
invoked, many researchers and commentators criticize the findings in the 1992 Cable Act
and the Supreme Court's use of these findings to uphold the rules. E.g., Nancy Whitmore,
Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and Must-Carry Policy: A Flawed Economic Analysis, 6
COMM. L. & POL'Y 175, 177, 223-24 (2001); Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing "Must-Carry"
Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 8 SUP. CT. EcON. REv. 141, 195, 201 (2000).
40. Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 189 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662).
44. Id. at 197 ("Horizontal concentration was increasing as a small number of multiple
system operators (MSO's) acquired large numbers of cable systems nationwide.").
45. Turner I1, 520 U.S at 203.
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stations had been dropped during periods without must-carry rules, 46
placing some stations in financial disarray.47 Accordingly, the Court found
the provisions to be consistent with the first prong of O'Brien.
48
Next, the Court examined the additional prong of O'Brien-namely
whether the must-carry rules were broader than necessary to accomplish
Congress's objective. Upon reviewing the evidence adduced on remand,
the Court found "cable operators have not been affected in a significant
manner by must-carry." 4S The Court cited many statistics to support its
finding: 87% of the time cable operators had been able to meet must-carry
requirements through previously unused channel capacity, 94.5% of cable
systems nationwide did not drop any programming to fulfill their
obligations, and cable operators carry an average of 99.8% of the
programming they carried before enactment of must-carry. The Court
conceded that a majority of stations continue to be carried without must-
carry. The Court also noted that the 5,880 broadcast channels, which
appellants contended would be dropped absent any legal obligations, only
placed a small burden on cable systems. In turn, "[b]ecause the burden
imposed by must-carry is congruent to the benefits it affords," 51 the Court
concluded the provisions are narrowly tailored to meet its objective of
preserving "a multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of
American households without cable."
52
46. Id. at 202.
47. Id. at 208-09. Although contrary evidence was presented, the Court clarified its
role, which was determining whether the legislative conclusion was supported by the record
before Congress, not "reweigh[ing] the evidence de novo," or "replac[ing] Congress' factual
predictions with [its] own." Id. at 211 (quoting Turner/, 512 U.S. at 666).
48. See id. at 196.
49. Id. at 214.
50. Id. While cable operators contended these figures were overblown, the Court
believed the results of must-carry spoke for themselves and stated, "It is undisputed that
broadcast stations gained carriage on 5,880 channels as a result of must-carry. While
broadcast stations occupy another 30,006 cable channels nationwide, this carriage does not
represent a significant First Amendment harm to either system operators or cable
programmers .... Id. at 215.
51. Turner 11, 520 U.S at 215. The Court analyzed and rejected several proposed
alternatives to the current must-carry rules, including: (1) the use of an A/B input selector
switch, (2) a leased-access regime system, (3) subsidy mechanisms to support financially
weak stations, and (4) antitrust enforcement or anticompetitive administrative procedures.
See id. at 219, 221-22. Even though such alternatives placed less strain on cable operators,
the Court articulated that "content-neutral regulations are not 'invalid simply because there
is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech."' Id. at 217.
(quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
52. Id. at 216.
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C. Digital Must-Carry
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 address advanced
television, 53 a new system of broadcast television commonly referred to as
digital television. In the legislative history, Congress stated that it did not
intend to "confer must carry status on advanced television or other video
services offered on designated frequencies" and added that the "issue is to
be the subject of a Commission proceeding under section 614(b)(4)(B) of
the Communications Act." 54 Furthermore, according to the House
Conference Report's interpretation of the 1992 Cable Act, when the FCC
adopts new standards for broadcast television signals, such as the
authorization to broadcast in high definition, the FCC must conduct a
proceeding to make any changes to signal carriage requirements. 55 Thus,
the must-carry laws seem to be flexible enough to cover technological
improvements, 5 6 and the FCC has authority to conduct a proceeding to
determine in what way these laws should apply.
In 2001 the FCC established must-carry for digital-only television
stations b 7 providing for carriage of a digital station that returns its analog
spectrum. The FCC found that the 1992 Cable Act "neither mandates nor
precludes the mandatory simultaneous carriage of both a television
station's digital and analog signals ('dual-carriage'). '' 58 The FCC also ruled
that Congress intended the term "primary video" in the digital context to
"mean[] a single programming stream and other program-related content 59
and not the multicast streams that local broadcasters may offer.60 As a
result, the digital-only station must elect which programming stream is its
primary video, and the cable operator must provide mandatory carriage to
53. 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
54. BENTON FOUND., LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND: DIGITAL TELEVISION AND CABLE TV,
http://www.benton.org/publibrary/policy/tvlegislation.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-862, at 67 (1992).
56. To further demonstrate its authority to reinterpret the must-carry rules in the digital
context, the FCC referred to the legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act. DTV Must-Carry,
supra note 14, para. 8. The FCC stated:
[T]he relevant language states that when the FCC adopts new standards for
broadcast television signals, such as the authorization of broadcast high definition
television (HDTV), it shall conduct a proceeding to make any changes in the
signal carriage requirements of cable systems needed to ensure that cable systems
will carry television signals complying with such modified standards in
accordance with the objectives of this section.
Id. n.25 (quotation omitted).
57. DTVMust-Carry, supra note 14.
58. Id. para. 2.
59. Id. para. 57.
60. See id. para. 55.
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the broadcaster's primary video stream. 6 1 The FCC allowed stations
flexibility to negotiate for full or partial carriage of its digital TV signal.
62
In addition, the FCC also allowed a commercial station that negotiates
retransmission consent of its analog signal to tie carriage of its digital
signal to carriage of its analog signal.
Despite acknowledging the substantial governmental interests in
preserving free television, a multiplicity of information sources, and fair
competition in the programming market,64 the FCC tentatively concluded
that dual carriage places an undue burden on cable operators and therefore
violates their First Amendment rights.65 Presently, cable operators are
"required to carry local television stations on a tier of service provided to
every subscriber and on certain channel positions designated in the [1992
Cable] Act."66 However, under the 1992 Cable Act, cable operators "are
not required to carry duplicative signals or video that is not considered
primary.'' 7 During the temporary transition from analog to digital
broadcasting, an "increasing redundancy of basic content between the
analog and digital signals as the Commission's simulcasting requirements
are phased in."68 If the FCC imposed a dual-carriage requirement, cable
operators would be required to carry identical digital and analog television
signals, and because of lessened channel capacity, cable operators could be
69forced to drop other programming services. To make a final
determination on dual-carriage, the FCC raised numerous questions
regarding the seven DTV proposals and requested further comment on
61. Id. para. 57. For further analysis on the meaning and importance of "primary video"
within the digital must-carry debate, see Michael M. Epstein, "Primary Video" and Its
Secondary Effects on Digital Broadcasting: Cable Carriage of Multiplexed Signals Under
the 1992 Cable Act and the First Amendment, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 525 (2004).
62. DTV Must-Carry, supra note 14, para. 27.
63. Id. para. 30.
64. Id. para 4.
65. Id. para 3. For further analysis of dual and multicast carriage, see Joel Timmer,
Broadcast, Cable and Digital Must Carry: The Other Digital Divide, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y
101 (2004).
66. DTV Must-Carry, supra note 14, para. 6 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(6)-(7),
§ 535(g)(5), (h)).
67. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3)(A), (b)(5), § 535(b)(3)(C), (g)). While the
broadcast industry urged the FCC to impose a dual-carriage requirement during the
transition period to "ensure that viewers have continued access to all available local
television programming[,]" cable operators argued that dual carriage would create blank
screens on their channel line-up, since "most consumers will not have digital television
receivers or converters allowing them to display digital signals on analog sets." Id. para. 10
(citations omitted).
68. Id. para 9.
69. Id.
70. See Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broadcast Stations, Notice
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other digital must-carry concerns, including evaluating digital carriage
agreements, retransmission consent, and market forces; calculating cable
system channel capacity;72 and identifying and applying program-
relatedness.
7 3
In February 2005, the FCC reaffirmed its earlier decisions in its
Second Report and Order and First Order on Reconsideration.
74
Specifically, the FCC reconsidered and ruled against the dual must-carry
requirement.75 The FCC also reconsidered and ruled primary video only
constitutes one programming stream, not the full bit stream of a local
digital broadcast station's combined multicast signals. 76 The FCC refuted
that a number of governmental interests would not be met absent a dual-
carriage requirement during the digital television transition. In light of the
Turner I and Turner If decisions and the application of intermediate
scrutiny, the FCC examined whether or not dual carriage would preserve
free over-the-air television and promote "widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources." 77 The FCC concluded that the
interests of viewers who wish to see local, over-the-air broadcast stations
are not clearly threatened without dual must-carry. Cable carriage is not
needed to ensure that noncable households have access to a digital
broadcast station, and nearly all local analog stations are carried under
retransmission consent or must-carry. In addition, "[t]he absence of a dual
carriage requirement might in fact encourage broadcasters to produce a
'rich mix of over-the-air programming' in order to convince cable
operators to voluntarily carry their digital signal. ' 78 Dual carriage also
promotes duplicative programming-the same program in both analog and
digital-and therefore does not promote the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources.
79
of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15092, paras. 40-50 (1998) [hereinafter Carriage of
DTV].
71. DTV Must-Carry, supra note 14, para. 130.
72. Id. para. 123.
73. Id. para. 122.
74. Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, Second Report & Order and First
Order on Reconsideration, 20 F.C.C.R. 4516, paras. 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter DTV Must-
Carry lI].
75. Id. para. 27.
76. Id. para. 44.
77. Id. para. 14 (citation omitted).
78. Id. para. 18.
79. Id. para. 19. Furthermore, evidence suggests dual carriage would not necessarily
expedite the DTV transition. See id. As of the beginning of 2005, cable operators offer an
HDTV program package option in 184 of the 210 designated market areas ("DMAs") and
carry more than 500 local DTV stations nationwide. Eighteen cable networks now offer
some form of HDTV programming during part of their schedule. Id. para. 24. As a result,
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After striking down dual carriage, the FCC examined what the must-
carry policy should be after the digital television transition is completed for
local stations who engage in multicasting. Even though the Congressional
intent is unclear regarding the meaning of what constitutes primary video in
the digital context, the FCC examined whether an alternative
interpretation would further the important governmental interests of free
over-air-television-"widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources"W and facilitation of the digital television
transition. According to the FCC, Congress and the broadcast industry
have failed to demonstrate that free local broadcasting would be
jeopardized without multicast carriage. With the single program stream
carriage requirement, a local broadcaster will still have a presence on the
local cable system and requiring additional broadcast streams from the
same broadcaster "would not promote diversity of information sources"
and "arguably diminish the ability of other, independent voices to be
carried on the cable system."' 83 The FCC believes that high quality digital
programming will best facilitate the transition, including cable operators'
desire to carry local HDTV broadcast content, a scenario still possible
under the single program stream carriage requirement.
84
Currently, the only viable regulatory alternative that exists for the
industry is to work within the parameters set forth by the FCC's DTV Must-
Carry Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
the FCC's Second Report and Order and First Order on Reconsideration.
Until the digital transition is complete,85 or until a local station returns its
analog spectrum voluntarily ahead of schedule, a local broadcaster may
the FCC believes that the above trends will be more likely to spur the sales of DTV sets than
the imposition of a dual-carriage requirement. Id. para. 25.
80. Id. para. 33.
81. Id. para. 37 (citation omitted).
82. Id. paras. 37-41.
83. Id. para. 39.
84. Id. para. 40.
85. To facilitate the timely recovery of analog spectrum, Congress and the FCC adopted
an aggressive policy requiring broadcasters to convert to digital so it could reallocate and
auction part of the existing spectrum utilized by analog broadcasting. The Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 provides an exception for the termination of analog services. A station may
extend its analog operation beyond 2006 if the television market in which it is operating has
not received an 85% penetration in DTV viewership. Otherwise, analog operation will end
when 85% of households in a given market can receive a digital signal. See Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3003, 111 Stat. 251, 265 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
309(j)(14)(B)). Congress changed the 85% rule to a hard date of February 18, 2009, when
broadcasters must return their analog spectrum to the government, effectively shutting down
analog TV broadcasting. See Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005,
Pub L. No. 109-171, § 3002, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C).
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only elect must-carry for its analog signal. When a station returns its analog
spectrum, then a station may invoke must-carry for the single, primary
video program-whether in HDTV or standard-definition-that they elect.
Unless otherwise specified in the future,86 the plan only provides a
mandatory right for a station's single, primary video signal. As a result,
retransmission consent bargaining and market forces are undoubtedly key
variables to examining viable policy alternatives, both during and after the
digital broadcast transition. Because more than sixty percent of all
households receive their local television broadcast signals through cable
systems, 87 significant progress needs to take place in reaching additional
retransmission consent agreements if the public at large is to reap the
potential benefits of digital broadcasting.
III. CABLE FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Because the FCC ruled against dual and multicast carriage, the FCC
declined to explore and reach any conclusions on the merits of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause arguments brought by cable operators.
88
Because of the FCC's most recent Order,89 cable operators may no longer
face the prospect of significant must-carry burdens in the form of dual or
multicast carriage of multiple channel streams. 0 Rather, as noted earlier,
the FCC ruled that "primary video" in the digital context meant only "a
single programming stream and other program-related content"
91
Nevertheless, broadcasters are likely to challenge the FCC's most recent
86. Based upon the DTV policy model employed in Germany, Ferree and Powell
believe the down-converting plan would expedite the transition because existing cable and
satellite subscribers who receive local stations may be included in the 85% rule calculation.
In addition, such a policy would nullify any need for a dual-carriage requirement for analog
and digital signals during the transition. Ted Hearn, Powell Floats a Rigid DTV Switchover,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 15, 2004, at 50; Ted Hearn, Powell Pushes Back on DTV Plan,
MULTICHANNEL NEws, Apr. 5, 2004, at 26. For more specific details and analysis of the
Berlin plan and its utility in the United States, see German DTV Transition Differs from U.S.
Transition in Many Respects, But Certain Key Challenges Are Similar: Testimony Given
Before Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, REP. NO. GAO-04-926T (2004) (statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director,
Physical Infrastructure Issues). In addition, the FCC deferred the issue of program-
relatedness in the context of digital must-carry for a subsequent report and order. See DTV
Must-Carry II, supra note 74, para. 44.
87. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of
Video Programming, Twelth Annual Report, FCC 06-11, para. 37 (2006), http:/Ihraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-06-I1Al.pdf. As of June 2005, 65.4 million of the
nation's 109.6 million television households subscribed to cable television service. Id.
88. DTV Must-Carry II, supra note 74, paras. 26,42.
89. See id.
90. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
91. DTVMust-Carry, supra note 14, para. 57.
[Vol. 58
Number 2] 5TH AMENDMENT & DIGITAL MUST-CARRY
order on constitutional grounds or urge Congress to pass specific digital
must-carry legislation.92 Furthermore, the FCC has extended a basic, single
program must-carry regime into the digital era.9 3 Cable operators may view'
the transition as an opportunity to gain more control over their facilities by
challenging any carriage and advocating for a regime based primarily on
retransmission consent.
Cable operators and their advocates are developing their Fifth
Amendment arguments. Lawrence Tribe, a law professor at Harvard Law
School, for example, was commissioned by the National Cable Television
Association ("NCTA") to write a report about digital must-carry in 2003.
In this report, he argued that multichannel must-carry violated the Fifth
Amendment. 94 More specifically, he argued that multichannel must-carry is
a form of actual, physical invasion that takes advantage of the substantial
investments made by cable operators in upgrading their facilities for digital
transmission, a per se violation of the Takings Clause.95  Legal
representatives for public broadcasting have responded to Tribe's
arguments by emphasizing that since must-carry was upheld by the
Supreme Court in the Turner litigation, the issue of multichannel carriage
does not raise Fifth Amendment implications.
96
92. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The National Association of
Broadcasters ("NAB") "will be working to overturn today's anti-consumer FCC decision in
both the courts and Congress." Todd Shields, It's Official: Must-Carry is Out, MEDIAWEEK,
Feb. 14, 2005, at 7, http://www.mediaweek.comlmw/search/article -display.jsp?schema=&
vnucontentid=1000798343&WebLogicSession=QhcqraUzNNyuPtU9fouOTEtLUzcQnE
Gal PlJfhqEbMcJQPIar6Da%7C 1399616429770259426/181605430/6FIOO5IO70517002700
2/7005/-1 (quoting Eddie Fritts, Chairman & CEO of the National Association of
Broadcasters). The NAB also asked the FCC to reconsider its second order concerning
digital must-carry. See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals, Petition for
Reconsideration of the National Association of Broadcasters and the Association for
Maximum Service Television, Inc., CS-Docket No. 98-120, April 21, 2005, available at
http://www.nab.org/Newsroom/PressRel/Filings/ReconPetitionCarriage42105.pdf.
93. See Clark, supra note 12.
94. TRIBE MEMORANDUM, supra note 1.
95. See generally id. (discussing the Takings Clause and the government's inability to
avoid the clause when the government takes a business and continues its operation). The
mere fact that cable operators may retain "title to and bare possession of the tangible real
and personal property necessary to provide programming," in the view of Tribe, does not
make the government's commandeering of the channel capacity any less blatant. Id. at 15
(citation omitted). Although Tribe acknowledged that must-carry obligations only occupy a
small portion of the cable operators' total bandwidth capacity, he stressed "[t]here is no
constitutional exception that allows the government to avoid the Takings Clause by taking
one strand of property at a time." Id. (citation omitted).
96. See Letter from Lonna M. Thompson et al., Vice President and General Counsel,
Ass'n of Public Television Stations, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, 7 n.8 (Mar. 4,
2004), available at http://www.apts.org/members/legal/public/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot
/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=6352_ 1.pdf.
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But because neither Turner decision directly addressed the Fifth
Amendment implications of must-carry, 97 such claims remain open as an
alternative basis for relief. The Fifth Amendment implications of digital
must-carry will likely be complex-more so than outlined in the debate
thus far. Following a typical Fifth Amendment analysis, this Part looks first
to whether must-carry qualifies as a per se taking, an actual physical
invasion, and then proceeds with an analysis of whether must-carry is a
regulation that goes too far in its interference with property rights, thus
giving rise to just compensation under a traditional regulatory takings
analysis.
A. Physical Appropriation
Must-carry may be characterized as a physical taking because the
provision authorizes local broadcasters to physically invade cable channel
capacity.98 State action that authorizes a permanent physical invasion
constitutes a per se taking, automatically giving rise to just compensation,
even if the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner is
negligible. This rule, formed from a long line of precedent, 99 was
summarized and succinctly announced in the 1982 decision of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,10 when the Court invalidated a
state statute that authorized the attachment of cable boxes to tenant
housing.' 01 Ignoring the de minimis nature of the space occupied by the
cable box, 102 the Court emphasized that any state-compelled, permanent
occupation gives rise to "a historically rooted expectation of
compensation."
0 3
97. In Turner I, however, Justice O'Connor noted that there may be Fifth Amendment
implications to must-carry. Unfortunately, the argument was not developed. See Turner I,
512 U.S. at 684 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. If a station elects retransmission
consent, then the cable operator compensates the station for programming. Such
compensation is dependent on market factors. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying
text. As such, no Fifth Amendment implications arise.
99. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("We hold that the 'right to
exclude' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within
this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.") (citation
omitted); Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others
from enjoying it.").
100. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 436-37.
103. Id. at 441 (noting that an occupation is "qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps
any other category of property regulation.").
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However, the Court cautioned that the per se rule did not extend to
"restrictions upon the owner's use of his property." 104 Had the statute, for
example, simply required the landlord to provide cable service to
requesting tenants, the landlord would have retained sufficient control over
cable installation and the per se rule would have been inapplicable.
10 5
Indeed, the right to exclude, as used in the Loretto decision, seems closely
related to trespass. 10 6 The state statute in Loretto allowed individual cable
installers to enter the landowner's property at will. 10 7 The Loretto Court
noted that "an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger
directly invades and occupies the owner's property."'108 Thus, a regulation
that did not completely and permanently divest an owner of this right to
• 109
exclude would not be a per se taking. It would be a restriction on use, a
restriction more appropriately analyzed under a traditional regulatory
takings analysis.
Determining how and when a regulation governs a use of a property
and when a regulation authorizes an actual, physical occupation may be a
bit tricky in the must-carry context. Does must-carry authorize an actual,
physical invasion of channel space, or does must-carry require cable
operators to offer local broadcast channels to subscribers in a convenient
manner? Many cable operators face pre-existing limitations on their use of
channel space per their historical development as a quasi-public, quasi-
private entity subject to limited public interest obligations. Is must-carry
a permanent invasion in the same way that the attachment of a cable box is
permanent, or is it more analogous to the temporary invasion of speakers in
a mall environment? Does must-carry compel a physical invasion in
physical space by taking cable bandwidth, or does must-carry merely
modify a use of a property by mandating limited relationships with local
broadcasters?
104. Id. Such powers included the right to impose "affirmative duties on the owner." Id.
at 436.
105. Id. at440--41 n.19.
106. See Dennis H. Long, Note, The Expanding Importance of Temporary Physical
Takings: Some Unresolved Issues and An Opportunity for New Directions in Takings Law,
72 IND. L.J. 1185, 1198-99 (1997) (citation omitted).
107. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423 n.3.
108. Id. at 436.
109. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court further drew a distinction between a
permanent "occupation" and a temporary "use." 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Court agreed that
landowners would issue "time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech activities so as to
ensure that such speech does not disrupt commercial functions. See id. at 394 (citing
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
110. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (determining that cable
could not be made into "pro tanto common carriers").
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Loretto suggests that per se analysis only applies in situations
involving a pre-existing, historically-based right to exclude.11' The Court
has traditionally protected real property interests with great zeal because of
the certain historical expectations associated with the development and use
of real property. l 12 Property-based protections for business interests fell
into disfavor after the demise of Lochner-era substantive due process
review in the 1930s because such protections tended to equate laissez-faire
economics with constitutional protection. 1 3 While the Fifth Amendment
continues to protect business interests and equipment against regulations
that go too far, less of a historical basis exists on which to base reasonable
expectations. As a result, the right to exclude and the per se test may not
extend to all forms of tangible and intangible property.
If this were so, claimants could require compensation by simply
couching their claims in terms of an actual, physical invasion. For instance,
a bank might allege that a regulation requiring a bank to divest 'for
fraudulent practices was a compelled, physical invasion of their
shareholders' profits. 1 4 A company might allege that a settlement
deduction for the use of a governmental tribunal was a compelled, physical
occupation of the settlement. 1 15 However, to borrow a term from the
Supreme Court, these examples show an "extravagant extension of
Loretto. ' 16 In such circumstances, the Loretto rule would usurp contract
remedies and other forms of relief; any person who faced economic harm
from a regulation would be able to claim an actual, physical invasion and
entitlement to just compensation. The cost of regulation would be
111. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (citation omitted).
112. See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modem Takings Doctrine And Its
Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 612-14.
113. See id. at 610. See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937)
("Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations ....") (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)).
114. In Golden Pacific Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the
court of appeals faced a Fifth Amendment claim by the Golden Pacific Bank that was based
in part on a claim there was a per se Loretto taking and in part on the Penn Central
balancing test. See id. at 1071-72. In this case, the Comptroller of Currency began an
investigation of Golden Pacific, the bank, for insolvency. Rumors of the investigation of the
bank lead to a run on the bank; the Comptroller then, based in part on this run, declared that
the bank was insolvent. See id. at 1069. The bank alleged that this was a physical invasion
of the bank's property, asserting that the action was a taking of the value of the stock for the
stockholders. See id. at 1073 (diminishing the value of the stock was not a physical
invasion). The court held however that there was no "historically rooted expectation of
compensation," and that because the bank was operating in a highly regulated field it had
"less than the full bundle of property rights." Id. at 1073-74 (citations omitted).
115. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 (1989).
116. Id. at 62 n.9.
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prohibitive.11 7 In essence, a deregulatory mandate would be encrypted into
the Constitution.
As a result, in those few cases that have looked at access to
telecommunication facilities from a property-based perspective, the courts
have avoided a direct application of the per se rule. For example, in
Qwest Corp. v. United States,11 9 a federal claims court determined there
was no permanent physical invasion when a law required incumbent local
telephone services to carry the signals of competing local telephone service
providers on an unbundled, nondiscriminatory basis. 120 The Qwest court
distinguished Loretto by emphasizing that the statute gave cable operators
control over the installation process itself,121  but the telephone
interconnection law gave incumbent phone companies power over
installation and service of equipment as well as the interconnection
process. 22 Qwest argued that physical occupation of the telephone wires
existed in terms of "flow of electrons."' 123 The court rejected this argument,
emphasizing that Loretto applied to invasion by physical objects that
invade physical space,' 24 that the regulation governed not real property but
117. McUsic, supra note 112, at 655 ("Economic interests, such as personal property,
trade secrets, copyright, and money, are all recognized by the Court as 'property' under the
Fifth Amendment, but receive little protection against government regulation.") (citation
omitted).
118. See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. United States., 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001); Berkshire
Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated, 773
F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
119. 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001).
120. Id. at 675 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)).
121. Id. at 691.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 693. Specifically, Qwest argued that there was physical occupation of its
loops, the telephone wire that comes into the home and is connected to a central office
switch-also known as the "first and last mile." Id. at 695.
124. Id. at 694. The physical and virtual collocation requirements in the Communications
Act were slightly more problematic. Physical collocation allowed competing access
providers to enter the physical offices of local exchange carriers and to "install and operate
its circuit terminating equipment" in this space, which virtual collection, allows the local
exchange carriers to mandate the equipment used by competing access providers and "to
string ... cable to a point of interconnection...." Id. at 691-92 (citation omitted). A prior
but noncontrolling decision had found physical collocation to be in violation of Loretto. Id.
(citing GTE Northwest, Inc. v. PUC, 900 P.2d 495 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1155
(1996)). The Qwest court emphasized that three main factors determinative in these
decisions-there is a direct physical attachment; a third party owns the material to be
attached; and, attachment is mandatory-would also be determinative if Qwest were directly
challenging a competing exchange carrier's physical collocation without just compensation.
Id. at 692. The holdings were not determinative, however, with regard to the loops, since
none of the factors were truly satisfied. See id. at 693.
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closely regulated equipment, 125 and that interconnection regulated the use
of property by mandating a lessor/lessee relationship. 1
26
In the context of highly regulated equipment-particularly when no
direct, physical, and tangible attachment is made-regulations may almost
always be construed as constituting property use rather than a physical
invasion. While Loretto stressed that the de minimis nature of the cable box
did not alter the nature of the invasion, 127 a de minimis exception does
seem to exist for intangible property and functional equipment. A
fundamental difference can be seen between digital and analog signals
passing to and fro along the cable lines and actual individuals passing to
and fro on a person's land. The latter instance is "qualitatively more
intrusive," thus justifying the application of a per se rule. 128 To refuse a
distinction would be to create a constitutional matrix that prioritized
property rights to such an extent that many other rights would be crippled.
The exception would subsume the rule, traditional takings analysis, and
even, as will be discussed infra, First Amendment analysis.
Furthermore, even in situations involving tangible, real property
invasions, it is unclear whether a pre-existing right to exclude continues to
exist regardless of the property's current use. In 1980, just two years before
Loretto, the Supreme Court in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
129
determined that California could, pursuant to its state constitution, require
mall owners to allow peaceful public speech on the premises. 130 The Court
had previously stated that the First Amendment did not limit private
property rights by extending public speech rights on private property.131
Nevertheless, the Court held that state legislatures could extend greater
speech protection than that afforded by the First Amendment by limiting
state-created property rights. 132 The Court thus suggested that the invasion
in PruneYard was not egregious because the mall owner profited by
creating a sense of public space.133
In Loretto, the Court distinguished PruneYard by emphasizing that
the invasion in Loretto was permanent, while the invasion in PruneYard
was only temporary and limited. 134 It is unclear, however, whether the
125. See id. at 694-95.
126. See id. at 695.
127. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1982).
128. Id. at 441.
129. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
130. Id. at 83.
131. Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
132. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-83.
133. Id. at 83-84.
134. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982).
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Court would continue to view a right of access for speech purposes as a
temporary invasion. For example, in dicta from Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n the Court explained that when "individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro" on private property by
an act of government, a violation of Loretto is likely. 135 How do we
distinguish between a right of access to pass to and fro and a right of access
to speak, as with must-carry?
The initial decision to open the property to the public in PruneYard
made the speech access right qualitatively less intrusive. 136 The Court
further developed this distinction in Yee v. City of Escondido,137 upholding
a rent control law against an allegation of invasion because the landowner
made the initial decision to enter the rental market. Determining how
regulations that give access to particular channels modify historical
The distinction between a permanent and temporary invasion, particularly in the must-carry
context, is further discussed in the context of regulatory takings. See Danaya C. Wright &
Nissa Laughner, Shaken, Not Stirred: Has Tahoe-Sierra Settled or Muddied the Regulatory
Takings Waters? 32 E.L.R. 11177, 11180-82 (2002). The time component adds a dimension
to the question of how to define the relevant property right being regulated. Per the current
analysis, permanence seems to refer to the fact that in the malls, speakers may come and go.
In the context of must-carry, however, the channels are more permanently occupied by
broadcasters.
135. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 453 U.S. 827, 832 (1987).
136. In Lloyd Corp., Ltd v. Tanner, however, a plurality of the Court reversed an
injunction against a mall owner preventing the owner from interfering with peaceful
demonstrations on the mall property. The Court reasoned that
[a]lthough accommodations between the values protected by [the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth] Amendments are sometimes necessary, and the courts properly have
shown a special solicitude for the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court
has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights
of free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for
private purposes only. Even where public property is involved, the Court has
recognized that it is not necessarily available for speaking, picketing, or other
communicative activities.
407 U.S. at 567-68.
The Court also stressed that property remains private even if the "public is generally invited
to use it for designated purposes," such as commerce. See id. at 569. However, in the
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, Justice Marshall spoke
of the implications of too strongly expanding property rights in this context:
As governments rely on private enterprise, public property decreases in favor of
privately owned property. It becomes harder and harder for citizens to find means
to communicate with other citizens. Only the wealthy may find effective
communication possible unless we... continue to hold that "[tihe more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.
Id. at 586 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)).
137. 503 U.S. 519, 531 (1992).
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expectations, and whether cable operators, like landlords, make the initial
decision to open their properties creates imperfect analogies.
Such imperfection is reflected in the fractured Denver Area
decision13 8 in which the Court was asked to determine the extent of cable
control over leased and PEG channels. Some Justices, for example,
determined that PEG access channels were a historical and pre-existing
limitation on cable franchises, 139 while other Justices would have required
a consistent and formal property-like demand of PEG channels by local
authorities in order to find such a pre-existing limitation. With respect to
leased access channels, Justices in Denver Area argued that the leased grant
did not guarantee freedom from cable editorial control, 14 1 and with respect
to both leased and PEG channels, three Justices argued that cable operators
were the original owners in much the same way booksellers own and
control bookstores and the materials sold therein.1
4
Analogizing must-carry to either PEG or leased channels is also
imperfect. Historically, early cable television systems did carry broadcast
channels almost exclusively until the FCC, through the origination rules,
required cable to produce original programming. 143 Unlike PEG channels,
however, which were negotiated by local authorities in exchange for
franchise rights to use local rights-of-way, must-carry is not the result of
negotiation, but of a government mandate to carry when negotiation, in the
form of retransmission consent, fails. 44 While the initial decision of cable
operators to offer cable communications may historically have included an
expectation of carriage, 14 5 the primary purpose of cable operators is to offer
their own programming and to offer channel space on a competitive basis
to nonaffiliated programmers. 146 Additionally, must-carry does not
138. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
139. See id. at 760-64 (plurality opinion).
140. See id. at 828 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing that a public forum analysis, the basis
of the analysis for a historical and pre-existing limitation on cable channel control, would
require, in the least, "property in which the government has held at least some formal
easement or other property interest permitting the government to treat the property as its
own in designating the property as a public forum.") Justice Thomas distinguished PEG
access channels as a regulatory restriction, not the appropriation of a formal property
interest. See id.
141. See id. at 746-52, 771 (Stevens, J., concurring), 824-27 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 824-27.
143. See United States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. 649, 655-56.
144. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
145. See Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 655-56.
146. The vertical program limit, however, stipulates that cable operators may air no more
than 40% of programming that they have an affiliated ownership interest in. See Time
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mandate a lessor/lessee relationship because broadcasters are not required
to pay for connection to the cable facility.
147
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the actual, physical invasion rule
would protect a cable company's ability to offer channel space on a
competitive basis to nonaffiliated programmers completely, particularly
since cable has historically been subject to public interest obligations.
Indeed, cable operators are limited in assuming a historically-based right to
exclude because they serve a uniquely public function and because of
particularly technological characteristics. In Turner I, the Court reasoned
that while cable operators were speakers for First Amendment purposes,
they may be subject to limited, viewpoint-neutral regulations like must-
carry because of their detrimental impact on free over-the-air
programming. 148 The Court was concerned with the ability of cable
operators to "restrict, through the physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas."'149 Unlike other
forms of mass communication like newspapers, cable operators were
uniquely positioned to prevent other speakers from reaching cable
subscribers-unless such speakers were able to contract for space on the
cable facility. 150 In the property context, such gatekeeping might suggest
that a physical takings analysis is inappropriate.131
In sum, the utility of the per se permanent, physical occupation test in
the context of digital must-carry is doubtful. Access for speech purposes is
considered a limitation on the right to exclude that is constitutionally valid
Warner Entm't v. FCC (Time Warner), 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding the
FCC's national household penetration cap and affiliated program channel limits to the FCC
for factual justification). The FCC is in the process of revising both the horizontal and
vertical ownership rules that apply to cable systems. See The Commission's Cable
Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits and Attribution Rules, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 17312 (2001); The Commission's Cable Horizontal and
Vertical Ownership Limits, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R.
9374 (2005).
147. See 47 U.S.C. §534(b)(10) (2000).
148. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656-57.
149. Id. at 657 (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 656-57.
151. In some respects, must-carry may be viewed as analogous to an easement by
necessity, a common law doctrine allowing a right of passage across surrounding private
property if a parcel is completely encapsulated. See Quinn v. Holly, 146 So. 2d 357, 359
(Miss. 1962). An easement by necessity seems to be an historical exception to a general
right to exclude that evolves out of practical necessity and public policy. Similarly, access,
if historically necessary to reach cable subscribers, may be an historical exception to a
general right of cable systems to exclude speakers. See Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It
Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23, 24
(2000) (suggesting that, with respect to broadband open access, "an open access requirement
amounts to a 'virtual easement' over the cable plant.").
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unless, as the Court in the later decision of Dolan explained, such
restriction unqualifiedly and unreasonably impairs the primary value or use
of the property. 152 An actual, physical invasion requires that there be an
actual, historical right to exclude based on both the nature and the function
of the property. Thus, even though the Loretto test, as a per se analysis, is
based on a lower evidentiary standard than that used in traditional
regulatory takings analysis, the application of this per se rule is limited.
153
Even if the Loretto rule does not apply, must-carry may certainly be viewed
as a regulation on the use of the property and thus may be analyzed under a
traditional regulatory takings analysis.
B. Regulatory Takings
The traditional test for regulatory takings emerged in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York ("Penn Central").r54 Penn Central involved a
claim against the designation of the Penn Central Station as a state historic
landmark, thus prohibiting its owners from developing the air space above
the monument. The Court utilized a three-prong, ad-hoc analysis that
considered the following: (1) the character of the governmental action; (2)
the economic impact of the action; and (3) the extent to which such action
interferes with the claimant's reasonable investment backed
expectations. 155 In general, the more intrusive the governmental action, the
greater the negative economic impact of the regulation on the plaintiff, and
the more reasonable the plaintiffs reasonable investment backed
expectations, the more likely a regulatory taking has occurred.
156
Based upon the three-part'test articulated above, Penn Central could
not prevail on its regulatory takings claim. First, the character of
governmental action in Penn Central-the historical landmark
designation-was not a direct physical invasion or motivated by a
"uniquely public function[]." 157 Second, in terms of economic impact of
the historic landmark designation, Penn Central gained transfer
development rights and still had the ability to use the airspace above the
152. See 512 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted).
153. See Wright & Laughner, supra note 134, at 11180.
154. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
155. Id. at 124. This test may not be applicable to facial challenges. See Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A Critique of
Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1301, 1361 (1989). Some courts have
suggested that a facial challenge requires that the mere enactment of the legislation may
deprive the owner of "all economically viable use." See id.
156. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127-28.
157. Id. at 128.
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terminal. 158 Third, because the regulation did not interfere directly with the
use of the station as a station, Penn Central still retained investment-backed
expectation interests.
159
Particularly egregious violations of any one of the Penn Central
factors may cause a court to award just compensation. For instance, an
actual, physical invasion may be a particularly egregious form of
government action because permanent, physical occupations interfere with
several property rights concurrently. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
determined that denial of economically viable use of a property is a
taking. 16  Absent these two limited circumstances, one of the most
determinative factors in regulatory takings analysis is the reasonableness of
the investment. 161 Such reasonableness is measured in terms of historical
protection of the uses affected by the regulation 162 as well as in terms of the
regulatory regime under which the owner does business. 163 The Court has
repeatedly stated that "mere unilateral expectations" and "abstract need" do
not translate into reasonable expectations. 
1 64
Doing business in a highly regulated field raises the bar for cable
operators hoping to show reasonable expectations. 165 In highly regulated
industries, the reasonableness of any expectation is significantly curtailed.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., for example, the Court identified a
traditional property interest in trade secrets-a taking would not occur
when disclosure of that trade secret is not prohibited by law. 167 Two years
later, the Court in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.168
emphasized that federal law could disregard or destroy existing contract
rights in highly regulated fields without violating either the Due Process or
158. See id. at 136 (noting that obstructions to Penn Central's use of the airspace were
not known to the Court).
159. Id. at 138 (holding that Penn Central retained the ability to improve the property).
160. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
161. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109 (assessing the constitutionality of the New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Law in terms of the "reasonable return" that was still
possible on the property owner's investment).
162. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
163. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1011-12.
164. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980);
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (finding an abstract
concern, but an insufficient property interest).
165. See generally Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 986 (assessing whether "reasonable
investment-backed expectation" existed with trade secrets, warranting just compensation for
the government taking them).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 1004-08.
168. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
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Takings Clause. 169 As a result, when a property owner does business in a
highly regulated field, the owner may only have a viable Fifth Amendment
claim against federal law affecting the final use, and only when there is an
explicit federal guarantee protecting such a use.170
The statutory framework governing cable operators has never
included an express guarantee that regulators will not impinge on the cable
company's use of its franchise, but preserved the right to encourage
competition and protect the public interest. 171 In United States v. Midwest
Video, the Court held that the FCC had ancillary jurisdiction over cable for
the purpose of enhancing television services. 172 Historically, cable has been
subject to a dual regulatory regime, where local authorities issue franchises,
the terms of which are curtailed by both federal legislation and the First
Amendment. 173 As a result of this history, cable operators have difficulty
arguing that they have reasonable expectations in any given regulatory
regime. 174 Furthermore, cable operators may be hard pressed to find an
explicit federal guarantee protecting expectancies against must-carry. One
such guarantee may come in the form of a federal prohibition that prevents
the regulation of cable as a common carrier. 17  Common carriers are
federally required to carry the speech of others on a nondiscriminatory
basis. 176While the issue was raised in first Turner decision by dissenting
Justice O'Connor, 177 in neither Turner decision did the Court hold that
must-carry contravened the federal prohibition against regulating cable as a
common carrier.
17 8
169. See id. at 223-24.
170. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1011.
171. See 47 U.S.C. 253(a)-(d) (2000).
172. See 406 U.S. at 665-66.
173. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 702 (1984) (citing the Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972)).
174. See, e.g., Cox, 866 F. Supp. at 556-59 (explaining that there were no property
interests in a contract and thus no takings).
175. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000) ("Any cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a
common carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service.").
176. See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10) (2000). See also MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, JOHN THORNE, &
PErER W. HUBER, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 11-15 (2d ed. 1999).
177. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 684 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
stated:
Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common
carriers for some of their channels .... Setting aside any possible Takings Clause
issues, it stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies
operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies; such an
approach would not suffer from the defect of preferring one speaker to another.
Id.
178. See id.; see also Turner I1, 520 U.S. 180.
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Furthermore, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorizes the
FCC to hold a hearing to determine whether the extension of must-carry to
digital technologies is appropriate. 179 As in Monsanto, it would seem that
protecting property rights in this instance would have the result of
interfering with federal flexibility in instituting a regulatory plan. 18 Absent
interference with a fundamental property right, or an outright appropriation
of the entire cable facility, cable seemingly has limited reasonable
expectancies in control over certain channels. Admittedly, however,
Monsanto involved the protection of trade secrets as a property right,18 1
and intellectual property may not receive the same degree of protection as
more tangible property and equipment, such as the channel space
commandeered for must-carry channels.
Nevertheless, given the extensive regulatory treatment of cable, it
appears unlikely that cable would be able to prove reasonable investment-
backed expectations to be free from access regulations, such as digital
must-carry. If the FCC had imposed a dual or multicast must-carry regime,
or if such a regime were to come into effect in the future, the added
burdens associated with digital must-carry-including the added
administrative costs-would make cable claims to reasonable investment
stronger. Under the current history in which reasonable expectations are
limited, however, cable operators may not be able to sustain a regulatory
takings claim because of Penn Central.1
82
If, however, a court did find reasonable expectancies, it would
balance such expectancies against the nature of the governmental action
and the economic impact of the regulation. The central goal of this
balancing is to determine whether the regulation is merely adjusting
benefits and burdens of social welfare183 or "forcing some people to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."' 184 The central goal of evaluating the "character ofgovernment action" is to "prevent unfair forms of redistributions [of
179. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
180. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1008. In Monsanto, the Court emphasized that "the
Trade Secrets Act is not a guarantee of confidentiality to submitters of data, and, absent an
express promise, Monsanto had no reasonable, investment-backed expectation that its
information would remain inviolate in the hands of EPA." Id. Similarly, the mandate that
the FCC hold a hearing to determine whether or not to extend must-carry, as authorized by
federal law, may limit the reasonable expectancies in complete channel space ownership.
181. Id. at 1003--04.
182. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135 (setting the test to determine whether a
regulation is a taking requiring just compensation).
183. See id.
184. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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wealth]."' 185 An egregious government action, like an actual, physical
invasion, favors the property owner, 186 while preventative measures, such
as those prohibiting a nuisance, favor the regulator.
187
The Penn Central Court further distinguished situations in which the
government is "acting in an enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of...
[a] property for some strictly governmental purpose" and situations in
which the government is regulating in favor of public welfare. 188 When
public welfare concerns arise, the government action is better justified-
even when regulations substantially interfere with the value or use of a
property. 18 9 If an entire property interest or an essential right' 90 is
destroyed, the government action, regardless of its public welfare purpose,
is constitutionally suspect.
In the case of cable operators, regulation is usually limited to actions
designed to serve the public interest and, as Turner emphasized, to balance
unequal technological and economic advantages that cable operators
possess.' 9 ' The cable industry is controlled by several large companies and
185. See Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393,
1433-34 (1991). Generally, fairness is based on (1) historical protections for the autonomy
of the landowner and (2) the necessity of balancing property rights against communal
interests. Two significant considerations that impact a court's analysis of the "character of
the governmental action," are the reason for, or purpose of, the action, and the degree to
which the action interferes with property rights. For instance, government reallocation of
property rights is likely to be viewed more negatively than reallocation for public interest
purposes. See id.; see also Webb, 449 U.S. at 160-61.
186. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433.
187. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-23 (noting that there is no right to use property in a
manner "akin to public nuisances," even if in denying the landowner the right to commit a
nuisance, the regulation destroys all economically viable use of the property).
188. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135.
189. See id. at 131.
190. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 706, 717 (1987); but see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 65 (1979). In Andrus, the Court refused to hold that a complete abolition of the right to
sell eagle feathers was a taking, since the property owner had not one "strand" in the "full
bundle" of property rights. Id. at 65-66. The Court noted that the owners could give the
feathers away or devise them. Id. Additionally, the Court noted that the "loss of future
profits" from the sale of the feathers is a "slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim."
Id. at 66. The burden in this case was to "secure the 'advantage of living and doing business
in a civilized community."' Id. at 67 (citation omitted). It is difficult to reconcile Andrus
with Hodel, except the Court in Hodel noted that the regulation seemed overbroad for its
purpose, and because the Native American land in that case was so fractionalized, it had no
real resale value. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718.
191. See Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 632-33. The Court stated:
Congress found that the physical characteristics of cable transmission,
compounded by the increasing concentration of economic power in the cable
industry, are endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to
compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues.
Congress determined that regulation of the market for video programming was
necessary to correct this competitive imbalance.
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faces little competition in a given market area. 192 A competing cable
company would likely be dissuaded from overbuilding by the high cost of
entry and the economies of scale. 193 Furthermore, cable has the ability to
gatekeep through its physical control over the first and last mile.
194
Because of this physical control, information is funneled through a cable
bottleneck, and thus, cable can prevent broadcasters and other programmers
from reaching cable subscribers. 195 These concerns, if reasonable, would
seem to be sufficient to end any inquiry into the social-welfare purpose of
the government regulation.
Nevertheless, if certain regulations interfere with a substantial
property right to a significant degree, such interference, regardless of its
overarching social-welfare purpose, violates fundamental property
protection. Thus, the character of government action in the context of must-
carry may favor the cable company if a cable company can show that a
fundamental or entire property right is taken. This question raises a
common problem in takings jurisprudence: the characterization of the
relevant property interest. Such a problem would not arise if, for example,
the government completely and directly appropriated a fundamental
property interest or an entire parcel. 196 Regulations, however, are seldom
so sweeping.
Courts measure the governmental action and the economic impact of
a regulation, not only in terms of the extent to which property rights are
modified, but also in terms of how much of the property is affected. 9 7 For
Id.
192. Id. at 633.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 656.
195. Id. For more analysis on how this bottleneck metaphor emerged within intermediate
scrutiny, see generally Whitmore, supra note 39.
196. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 ("constitutional protection for the rights of private property
cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied"); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331-32 (2002), where
the Court stated:
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its
geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of
the owner's interest. Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be
viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the
entire area is a taking of 'the parcel as a whole,' whereas a temporary restriction
that merely causes a diminution in value is not.
Id. (citation omitted).
197. See Benjamin Allee, Note, Drawing the Line in Regulatory Takings Law: How a
Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the Denominator Problem, 70
FORDHAM L. REv. 1957, 2006 (2002) ("Substantiality [as an approach by which to evaluate
the effect of a regulation on the property rights of a landowner) deals with losses to
conceptually independent parcels of land.").
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this reason, claimants attempt to make regulations appear more egregious
by narrowly characterizing the affected property-limiting it to a particular
property interest that is directly regulated. 198 Cable operators, for instance,
may claim that access or must-carry regulations essentially condemn the
affected bandwidth rather than merely a portion of their entire capacity to
transmit. 199 In this way, the character of the governmental action and the
economic impact of the regulation appear more intrusive.
In order to determine the relevant property right, courts often look to
the substantiality of the alleged taking-both in qualitative and quantitative
terms.20 The Loretto Court, for example, determined that the actual,
physical invasion was more significant than the minimal size of the
property affected because the regulation had a _permanent impact on a
fundamental property right-the right to exclude.2 " Permanence, however,
may not be required to invoke Fifth Amendment protection.
The Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles202 held that a temporary regulation could
constitute a taking just as in older cases where temporary wartime
appropriation of businesses, such as steel plants, were takings. 203 In these
cases, the temporary nature of the invasion did not mitigate the Fifth
Amendment implications of the invasion. 204 In the must-carry context,
cable operators may argue by analogy that the cable company's decision to
enter the cable business cannot be conditioned on the occupation of channel
space by broadcasters and other competitors.
20 5
Wartime appropriation, however, took over the entire business and
thus today might be a denial of all economically viable use206 and a direct
interference with historical protections for the right to exclude2°7 -both
198. See Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings
and Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REv. 571, 616-17 (2003).
199. See, e.g., Complaint at 78-81, Comcast Cablevision v. Broward Co. (S.D.Fla. 1999)
(No. 99-6934-CIV), http://www.techlawjournal.com/courtsbroward/19990720.htm.
200. See Allee, supra note 197; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
201. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (citation omitted).
202. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
203. Id. at 317-18; see also Wright & Laughner, supra note 134, at 11184.
204. Id. at 318 ("Though the takings were in fact 'temporary,' there was no question that
compensation would be required for the Government's interference with the use of the
property ... .") (citation omitted).
205. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 885, 940 n.220 (2003) (noting that even a
partial and temporary occupation of private property, as per access to network regulations,
requires just compensation because such access requirements prevent the business owner
from creating new facilities.).
206. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-19.
207. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419 (citation omitted).
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constitute per se takings. 20 More importantly, to read First English
209
210 211
consistently with PruneYard, Yee, and other access cases, it seems
that the importance of the permanence of the invasion is indirectly
proportional to the size of the entire property interest affected. Thus, the
relative permanence of the invasion seems somewhat dependent on the
definition of the relevant property interest in quantitative terms.
Courts use federal and state laws to define the relevant property
interest212 unless, of course, a per se violation is implicated. 2 13 Franchise
agreements set the terms of cable service. Such agreements are modifiable
by federal regulation and local ordinance. 214 Thus, while must-carry
provisions do take bandwidth, 2 15 it is unlikely that the court would find the
particularly affected bandwidth to be the relevant property interest. As the
physical appropriation discussion makes clear, it is also doubtful that the
court would find must-carry to be a permanent invasion because only a
relatively small portion of the bandwidth is taken, much like a temporary
easement. 2 16 Even if multicast must-carry is ultimately implemented, the
anticipated six-fold increase in carriage burdens that result from multiple
broadcast streams is relatively small in comparison to the overall channel
capacity of a cable provider, and the six-fold increase will not change the
overall amount of bandwidth occupied. 2 17 Thus, must-carry may not be a
particularly egregious form of governmental action since cable o erators
retain significant editorial control over a majority of their facility.
The final factor in the traditional Penn Central regulatory takings
analysis looks at the "economic impact of the regulation. ' 219 Just as the
208. See Wright & Laughner, supra note 134, at 11184.
209. 482 U.S. 304.
210. 447 U.S. 74.
211. 503 U.S. 519.
212. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001.
213. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37 ("[C]onstitutional protection for the rights of
private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied.").
214. See 47 U.S.C. 545 (2000); see also Tribune-United Cable Company v.
Montgomery County, 784 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1986).
215. See Complaint, supra note 199, para. 81.
216. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (finding that a temporary easement is not a per se
taking).
217. See Epstein, supra note 61, at 562-63 (citations omitted). Epstein explains that
"[a]lthough a digital signal may be split into up to six sub-channels, the amount of signal
bandwidth remains the same as it was as an analog signal, 4.3 Mhz." Id. at 563 (citation
omitted). Epstein also notes that there has been a "large increase in cable programming on
most analog cable systems in the last decade"-an increase likely to make the must-carry
burden seem proportionally less burdensome. See id.
218. DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 828-29 n.ll.
219. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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character of government action becomes more egregious when it
substantially affects the entire property interest, so too does the economic
impact become more egregious when economic loss "relative to the
particularly affected property" is proportionally greater. 22 In Penn Central,
the Court noted that mere diminution in property value did not tip the
balance in favor of the claimant, particularly with respect to speculative
land uses. 22 1 Instead, the Court looked exclusively at the regulation's
impact on the present use of the property, not on the prospective use of
airspace above the station.222 Just as there is no constitutional guarantee
preventing the passage of regulations that would ultimately and incidentally
diminish the value of corporate stock, there is likewise no guarantee
embedded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that would guarantee
property against regulations that might harm resale value.223 To the extent
the cable operators allege the government is appropriating their future
profits and market share, it is unlikely they would fair any better than Penn
Central did when alleging that a historic preservation statute appropriated
airspace.
224
This is particularly true with respect to access-type cable regulations
like must-carry. As one lower court has noted, Fifth Amendment
protections do not include "eternal monopolistic, industry-wide protection
from competition."' 22 5 Must-carry, however, differs from leased-access in
that carriage is mandated and no money changes hands.226 Cable operators
may be able to argue that they no longer have the channel space to carry
independent public interest programming, such as C-SPAN, PEG channels,
or local public television stations because of must-carry burdens to carry
local broadcast stations. 227 While the FCC's denial of multicasting
obligations may lessen these costs and burdens, cable operators may
experience a loss in revenue represented by the channel space now
occupied by must-carry channels that would otherwise be open to
220. See Paul, supra note 185, at 1501.
221. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 136-37.
223. See Wright & Laughner, supra note 134, at 11188 (citation omitted).
224. See Penn Central, 458 U.S. at 138.
225. See Cox, 866 F. Supp. at 559.
226. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Stations, Comments of A&E
Television Networks, FCC CS Docket No. 98-120, at 14-18 (2001),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&iddocument=
6512569255; Letter from Glenn Moss, Sr. V.P. for Business Affairs & Affiliate Relations,
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independent programmers.
In summary, cable operators face an uphill battle in making a
traditional regulatory takings claim against the current digital must-carry
requirements. However, if multicast obligations are legislatively imposed,
or if broadcasters successfully challenge the limited must-carry order, then
cable operators may be in a slightly stronger position to show that digital
must-carry infringes on their reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Further, digital must-carry has a greater economic impact on cable
operators, particularly if dual and multicast carriage requires them to
abandon independent and cable network programming. Even if greater
digital must-carry burdens were imposed, the ultimate fate of a regulatory
takings claim would depend on the characterization of cable's regulatory
history, cable's ability to anticipate heavier must-carry burdens in light of
digital technology, and the relative amount of channel space occupied by
any digital must-carry burdens. In light of these concerns, one may argue
that the cable industry could anticipate some increased must-carry burden
because of the technological innovation associated with digital
broadcasting (e.g., efficiency of bandwidth) and changing expectations of
the public with respect to free over-the-air broadcasting.
22 F
But even if the bottleneck argument is no longer as persuasive
because of increased competition and innovation of digital broadcast
television and direct-broadcast satellite ("DBS"), it nevertheless could be
established that retransmission consent is more consistent with cable
property rights than mandatory carriage-a point thoroughly discussed in
Part IV.
IV. COMPELLED SPEECH AND PROPERTY IN THE CABLE CONTEXT
As mentioned previously, cable is a quasi-public entity that is
protected as a speaker under the First Amendment 2Z9 and, yet, subject to
limited public-interest regulations because of its ancillary effect on
broadcasting. 23 When discussing the gatekeeping control inherent to the
cable industry, the Turner Court emphasized that cable subscribers could
be denied access to a certain type of programming. 23 1 At the time Turner I
was decided, cable service may have been the only service available in
certain areas.23 2 Now, alternatives like DBS are more prevalent.
233
228. See Epstein, supra note 61, at 560 (emphasizing that broadcaster's must-carry needs
do not remain static in light of changing technology).
229. See Turner ,512 U.S. at 650,656.
230. Id. at 650-52.
231. See id. at 656.
232. Id. at 633.
233. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
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Nevertheless, concern over gatekeeping was not focused on the ability of
cable to reach consumers when other television providers could not.
2 34
Rather, the Court focused on the ability of cable to block access to cable
subscribers. 2 35 Because of this ability to drown out other speakers, the
Turner I Court distinguished must-carry regulations from situations
involving compelled speech-when a state actively forces individuals to
advocate for, or associate with, a particular speaker or viewpoint.
236
Gatekeeping control can also influence a property-based analysis. For
example, when the government compelled a utility service to include a
competitor's views in its billing statements, there was a question as to
whether the law interfered with the public utility's property right in its
envelopes. 237 The Court in Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Public
Utilities Commission of California found that First Amendment rights were
not contingent on ownership, though the envelopes were property of Pacific
Gas.2 38 Applying a First Amendment analysis, the PG&E Court held that
the regulation was content-based because it prioritized the speech of a
particular point of view-a difference the Court used to distinguish
Prune Yard.
2 39
How might the space in a billing envelope and space on channel
capacity compare? Per the common description, property describes a series
of rights associated with ownership, such as the right to exclude, the right
to alienate, and the right to develop. If property encompasses a series of
rights, is there a way to draw a practical distinction between the right to
exclude unwanted speakers from space on a letter and to exclude unwanted
speakers from space on a channel? The Court has increasingly extended
property based protections for more nebulous economic and contractual
rights, 2 ° and a significant possibility remains that a regulatory takings
of Video Programming, Tenth Annual Report, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, paras. 7, 69 (2004),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-04-5Al .pdf.
234. See Turner1, 512 U.S. at 656.
235. Id. ("[S]imply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, a
cable operator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to programming it chooses
to exclude.").
236. Id. at 653.
237. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n (PG&E), 475 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1986).
238. Id.
239. See id. at 12.
240. See McUsic, supra note 112, at 624-26. McUsic emphasizes that in the late 1970s
and 1980s, the Court began to combine a broad definition of property that incorporated
reference to economic rights and tests that smacked of traditional due process analysis, such
as the fragmentation of property interests and the means/end test used in Dolan, 512 U.S. at
374. This trend has been well documented by legal scholars.
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analysis might raise constitutional implications with respect to access-type
regulations like must-carry.
On the surface it would seem that where compelled speech and
property intersects, a due process analysis may be the appropriate
framework. Under such a lens, the issue becomes whether the government
is illegally overstepping its bounds by interfering with a fundamental
constitutional right like property. To analyze space in an envelope as a
form of property subject to Takings, however, would import such an
expansive reading of property rights into the Takings and Due Process
clauses that it would be difficult to envision a social welfare regulation that
would be able to pass Fifth Amendment scrutiny in the absence of just
compensation. Such a broad reading of property would essentially have the
same effect that the Lochner era substantive due process review had on
social welfare legislation.24 1 In essence, it would tie the hands of regulators
and legislators hoping to promote the public interest by defining public
interest to mean laissez-faire economic policies and private interests
superseding public rights.
242
Despite problems associated with defining how to set limits on
property, however, property rights help establish the degree of association
between the speaker and the allegedly compelled message. In the presence
of strong, traditional property rights-such as real property interests-
compelled speech and property strengthen one another in terms of the
association between the property owner and the speaker. In the absence of
private property rights, such an association is difficult to establish. With
respect to PEG access channels, for example, courts have considered a
limited public fora analysis, which would prevent cable operators and the
local governments from claiming that mandatory carriage of broadcast
241. See McUsic, supra note 112, at 614 (discussing the impact of Lochner); The
reasons such review is disfavored was succinctly stated by the Court in Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), where it noted that:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause... to strike
down.., laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought
.... We emphasize what Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v. State of Illinois...
[flor protection against abuses by the legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts.
Id. (citation omitted).
242. See Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal For Speech, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
137 (1994); See McUsic, supra note 112, at 624-25. It would seem that too strong of a
reliance on property rights would have the regulatory effect of returning us to a pre-New
Deal public interest philosophy viewing corporate rights as virtually synonymous with
public rights. See LOUISE M. BENJAMIN, FREEDOM OF THE AIR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN BROADCASTING TO 1935 4-6 (2001).
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signals via must-carry requirements compel speech.24 3 Such an analysis
also limits any assertion of a property-based right to exclude because the
property owner benefits from making his or her property publicly
available.
244
Both rights also are modified by necessity when balancing multiple
constitutional rights. A landowner cannot prevent workers from gathering
information about their legal rights by alleging that the transmission of
information across the property is a form of invasion or trespass. 245 The
rights of the individual on the property to receive information in these
circumstances are paramount to the property rights of the landowner.
246
Similarly, in the compelled speech cases, nonviewpoint specific regulations
that prevent businesses from walling off subscribers and listeners do not
violate the First Amendment rights of the provider. In Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC, the right of the public to a variety of information on
a public medium was paramount to the broadcasters' right of editorial
control. 247 In Turner I, the right of the cable subscriber to receive broadcast
television without having to change his or her home technology
configuration through a broadcast switch was effectively paramount to the
243. Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 192-94 (5th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528
U.S. 1021 (1999). In Horton, the court considered but did not determine whether PEG
access channels were public fora. See id. at 190-93. It noted, however, that the Supreme
Court has said that the "the public forum doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical
way to the very different context of public television-broadcasting." Id. at 192 (citing
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998)). And that the majority
of justices in Denver Area refused to consider Justice Kennedy's argument that access
channels are a public forum. 1d; See also Denver Area, 518 U.S. 780-81 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Denver Area, 518
U.S. at 749-50 (Breyer, J.) (refusing to consider public forum doctrine); Denver Area, 518
U.S. at 826-30 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that PEG channel is not a public forum)).
244. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83-84.
245. See New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
246. See id. at 373-74. The Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that by law, an
attorney and health care worker could enter private property to inform migrant workers of
their rights without raising Fifth Amendment right to exclude concerns since the interests of
the migrant worker outweighed the values supported by private property in this context. Id.
247. 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969). Although the Red Lion decision was based in part on the
now defunct and much criticized fairness doctrine, two aspects of the Red Lion decision are
particularly germane to this analysis. First, the Court in Red Lion noted that "[t]he right of
free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not
embrace the right to snuff out the speech of others." Id. (citing Assoc. Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). The right of a broadcast license had not conveyed a right to
monopolize the use of a scarce resource, but only the right to use the medium as a proxy for
the public interest. Second, the Red Lion Court noted that there were countervailing interests
at stake: the "right of the viewers and listeners," an interest that was "paramount" to the
broadcast licensee's right to engage in "unlimited private censorship ... in a medium not
open to all." Id. at 390, 392.
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cable operators' right to be free from broadcasters' views. 248 In Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, the Court upheld the right of newspapers to exclude
unwanted speakers because of historical protections associated with a free
and vibrant press.249 As explained in Turner I, because newspapers cannot
prevent delivery of alternative views in a separate publication, newspapers
have no control over the mailbox or the public.
250
With respect to Fifth Amendment takings claims to must-carry, such
challenges must account for the technological changes that may make
gatekeeping a less-than-persuasive argument. In light of the anticipated
success of local digital broadcasting multicast services and robust DBS
competition, cable may no longer be a technological gatekeeper. Absent
gatekeeping control, and in light of the Supreme Court's recognition of
cable as speakers, must-carry may violate the First Amendment because
cable subscriber rights to receive information would not be directly
implicated. Concurrently, property rights in such channels would be
strengthened.
To the degree that gatekeeping concerns continue to focus on the right
of cable subscribers to receive local broadcast programming, neither the
digital broadcast transition nor increased competition from DBS are
particularly persuasive. Instead, the analysis would depend on whether
gatekeeping concerns are reconceptualized from focusing narrowly on
cable subscribers and broadly on a general video audience. The question
remains whether the government could show a continued substantial
interest-that is, whether must-carry is necessary to preserve broadcasting
and whether, as emphasized in Turner II, must-carry continues to pose a
proportionally limited burden on cable operators. 25 1 Therefore, the ultimate
question with respect to must-carry and gatekeeping concerns, whether
from a First or a Fifth Amendment perspective, hinges on whether limiting
cable autonomy rights is necessary to preserve access to the information
and diversity that local broadcast stations provide to the public.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea that the First Amendment protects against compelled speech
but does not protect those that would drown out others is not a novel
concept. Such a view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Associated
248. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656-57.
249. 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) ("A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable
goal, . . press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other
virtues, it cannot be legislated.").
250. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 656 ("A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can
thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.").
251. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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Press v. United States2 52 when it stated that "[flreedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests. ' 253 The idea that the Fifth
Amendment does not protect against easements by necessity and against
254
rights of access for legal counseling is also not new. And yet, pressure to
allow such drowning in favor of private rights seems to be mounting.
Furthermore, when private interests seek to repress alternative voices,
reliance on property rights and Fifth Amendment claims seems to be
growing, particularly as private property protections expand.
255
Fifth Amendment claims against digital must-carry represent only one
of many takings challenges in today's telecommunications landscape, each
of which has its own set of permutations. Admittedly, this analysis only
begins to explore property implications associated with telecommunications
policy issues. For example, it also may be anticipated that property-based
claims may be used in the future to influence regulatory policies
concerning Interactive Television Services ("ITV"). Digital technology
allows for the development and use of new interactive television services
that will provide subscribers with the ability to select and input information
related to, or in addition to, the video programming available. Currently,
however, questions exist as to whether a nondiscrimination rule should
prevent cable from discriminating in favor of the ITV enhancements of
affiliated programmers and from discriminating against the enhancements
of independent programmers and local broadcasters.256 Such a
nondiscrimination rule would likely raise similar First Amendment and
Fifth Amendment concerns expressed here with respect to digital must-
carry.
The possibility remains that public rights may be paramount when
necessary to receive information and may modify the historical and
reasonable expectations of the property owner. This possibility is
influenced on those factors emphasized by the Supreme Court in its
approach to the First Amendment rights of cable, newspapers, and
252. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
253. Id. at 20.
254. Shack, 277 A.2d at 373.
255. Professors Norman Dorsen and Joel Gora in an article analyzing the way property
rights influenced First Amendment rights during the Burger Court reached this conclusion.
They emphasized that "when free speech claims are weighed in the balance, property
interests determine on which side of the scales 'the thumb of the Court' will be placed."
Mark Cordes, Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (quoting
Norman Dorsen & Joel M. Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Court: Old Values, New
Balances, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 195).
256. See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Services
Over Cable, Notice of Inquiry, 16 F.C.C.R. 1321, para. 6 (2001).
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broadcasters: technology, particularly gatekeeping control and historical
public use and tradition, as argued in this analysis.
In all of the cases mentioned herein, and as this must-carry property
analysis demonstrates, competing and overlapping First and Fifth
Amendment concerns create ambiguities. In the context of cable and
property rights, Fifth Amendment doctrine and takings law seems to be
isolated from First Amendment doctrine and even from more traditional
takings analysis. 257 While analogies can be drawn between real property
takings and intellectual property cases, courts seem to be reluctant to draw
these analogies. The process of drawing such analogies is important,
however, to understand the meaning of private property rights in a quasi-
public business.25 8 Indeed, with respect to many forms of communication
providers, such as common carriers, property rights jurisprudence remains
ambiguous; 259 such ambiguity is naturally extended to cable technologies.
If, as Commissioner Abernathy suggests, the regulation of certain
services, such as cable broadband services, is motivated by assumptions
about protecting personal property rights in order to encourage innovation
and development, this cable property analysis of must-carry may provide
the foundation for overcoming speculative assumptions about cable
property rights. Subsequently, this understanding may help prevent the
misuse of property-based rhetoric to inappropriately harm competition or
limit the scope of must-carry or other access regulation. Indeed, if must-
carry has become a policy quagmire because it was written for an analog
world, it is also a legal quagmire with respect to the property and speech
rights implicated by any regulatory approach. As shown, cable property
arguments against must-carry are riddled with ambiguities and weakness.
Nevertheless, these arguments may influence regulatory policy and
indirectly contribute to a loss of public access to the benefits of digital
broadcast television, if and when market forces fail to allow for
negotiation.
257. See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88.
258. See Eric R. Claeys, Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, The Takings Clause, and Tensions in Property Theory,
Paper Presented Before the Conference Avoiding a Tragedy of the Telecomms: Finding the
Right Property Rights Regime for Telecommunications (Mar. 18, 2004), at 2,
http:llwww.manhattan-institute.orglpdf/cde5-17-04_claeys.pdf.
259. Id. at 26.
260. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Commissioner, FCC, The Role of Property Rights in
Understanding Telecommunications Regulation (May 17, 2004), at 2, http://hraunfoss.fcc.
gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/DOC-247332Al.pdf ("Policymakers seldom focus explicitly
on property rights, and yet such a discussion can shed light on how regulation affects invest-
ment incentives and the behavior of firms in the marketplace.").
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Beyond the must-carry context, the unraveling and understanding of
cable operators' Fifth Amendment claims have significant public-policy
implications. Compared to other facilities-based competitors like DBS or
local exchange carriers, the cable industry is arguably in the best market
and technological position to provide households with a bundled array of
services that include video programming, ITV, high-speed Internet access,
and affordable telephone service, as evidenced through its recent rollout of• 261
Voice-over-Internet Protocol. While Congress or the FCC may pass laws
or rules in the public interest to curb the cable industry as it continues
expand into new offerings, recent trends suggest the industry will continue
to challenge such measures under First and Fifth Amendment claims.
Although used predominantly as a current rhetorical device to influence
policymakers, it is only a matter of time before cable operators' Fifth
Amendment claims will further develop in court and serve as another check
and balance to curb government regulation.
261. See generally Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, FCC 05-13 (2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchFCC-05-13AI.pdf (documenting trends
in the market place and competition for the delivery of video programming).
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